This is a part of my Game Theory Series. I have several equity analyses in the works, but it’s fun to spin the brain in a different direction. Please let me know if you have any questions or comments! There are mixed views about the President, but he tweets enough content to fuel several blog…

Let’s say that there are three fishermen, and each day they individually decide how many boats to send out to catch fish in the local lake. A fisherman can send out one or two boats, and the daily cost of a boat is $15. The more boats sent out, the more fish are caught. However,…

Consider the infinitely repeated version of the symmetric two-player stage game below. The first number in a cell is player 1’s single-period payoff. Suppose the stage game is repeated three times and each player’s payoff is the sum of the single-period payoffs. Assume that past actions are common knowledge.

Consider the infinitely repeated version of the symmetric two-player stage game in the following figure. The first number in a cell is player 1’s single- period payoff. The second number in a cell is player 2’s single period payoff.